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The labor force participation rate of married women first declines and then rises as
countries develop. Its U-shape is revealed both across the process of economic development and
through the histories of currently advanced economies. The initial decline in the participation
rate is due to the movement of production from the household, tmily farm, and small business
to the wider market, and to a strong income effect But the income effect weakens and the
substitution effect strengthens at some point. This paper explores why the change takes place
and why the U-shape is traced ouL When women are poorly educated their only wage labor
outside the home and family farm is in manual work, against which a strong social stigma exists.
But when women are educated, particularly at the secondary level, they enter white-collar work,
against which no social stigma exists. Data for more than one hundred countries and for United





and NBER'It is open to men to debate whether economic progress is good br men or not
but for women to debate the desirability of economic growth is to debate whether
women should have the chance to cease to be beasts of burden and to join the
human race.'
W. Arthur Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth (1955)
Gender equality and economic development share a synchronous existence, Gender
equality is a spur to economic development, particularly where the well-being of children is
concerned, and economic development, as the headnote graphically suggests, fosters gender
equality.
It is the relationship from economic development to greater gender equality that Is explored
here. I examine the roles played by education and the emergence of a white-collar sector In
fostering the paid employment of married women. The movement of women from the home to the
work piÈce promotes various types of gender equality both in society at large and in the home,
although the process has been protracted in a number of countries. Women's changing status
across economic development can be studied in the histOries of developed economies and through
a cross-section of the world's economies. The historical case used here is the United States over
the past century, and the cross section is a data set of more than one-hundred countries.
Across the process of economic development adult women's labor force participation rate
is u-shaped. When incomes are extremely low and when certain types of agriculture dominate (for
example, poultry, dairy, rice, cotton, peanuts; generally not grains, livestock, tree crops, sugarcane),
women are in the labor force to a great extent. They are sometimes paid laborers but more often
unpaid workers on family farms and in household businesses, often doing home workshop
production. As incomes rise in most societies, often because of an expansion of the market or the
introduction of new technology, women's labor torte participation rates fall. Women's work Is often
implicitly bought by the family, and women then retreat into the home, although their hours of work
may not materially change. The decline In female labor force participation rates owes; In part to
an income effect but it may be reinforced by a reduction ki the relative price of home produced
1goods and by a decrease in the demand for women's labor in agriculture. Even when women's
relative wage rises, married women may be barred from manufacturing employment by social
J
custom or by employer preference.
But as female education improves and as the value of women's time in the market
increases still further, relative to the price of goods, they move back into the paid labor force, as
reflected in the move along the rising portion of the U-shaped curve. The process suggests an
initially strong income effect combined with a small own-substitution effect.' At some point the
substitution effect increases while the income effect may decline. During the falling portion of the
U the income effect dominates, but during the rising portion of the U the substitution effect
dominates. I will address how the substitution effect comes to dominate and what relationship
exists between the income and the substitution effects.
The notion that economic development enhances gender equality is not, I know, shared
by all (see, for example, Norris 1992 for a model of immiseration). Nor is it universally agreed that
a movement toward gender equality, as expressed for example in greater female schooling,
causally enhances economic development. But I believe both notions are valid for the vast majority
of countries and economies at least in certain ranges of economic development. In many cases
the reason for the controversy regarding the first line of causality - running from economic
development to greater gender equality -- concerns the U-shaped relationship between economic
development and female labor force participation. Movements along the declining portion of the
U may lead to the imniiseration of women. But those along the rising portion generally do not.
Central to understanding the relationship between the economic status of women and
economic development is isolating the factors that cause the u-shaped function to change direction
and rise with economic developrnent rather than fall A further issue is what meaning increased
labor force participation outside the home has in the lives of the world's women. Factors will vary
from country to country, but there is considerable evidence that as women's work moves out from
the home and family, even if such work was previously market-oriented, women gain freedoms in
2the polity, in the society, and in their own households.2 The relationship is far fromperfect,and
in some cases political freedoms actually occurred decades before economic change was apparent
But the relationship does appear to exist There is also the issue of decision-making in the
household. We know little about how resources are divided within the home, particularly among
households in the richer nations of the world. We do know, however, that when women have the
capacity for economic independence, they generally make more decisions within the household and
control more resources (see, for example. Thomas 1990).
The first issue to address is the general u-shaped relationship between economic
development and women's labor force participation. An uncomplicated graphical model of
household and market production guides the discussion of the factors accountIng for the u shape.
Data on about a hundred countries are examined to establish the relationship between women's
labor force participation and economic development, and among female education, the clerical
sector, and economic development in cross.section, The historical record for thØ United States
since 1890 provides evidence concerning the transition to the upward portion on the U. Finally,
I return to the large cross section of countries to explore the relationship between economic history
and economic development in terms of women's economic role and status.
1. Economic development and the U-shaped female participation ra function
1.1 The u in cross section
Several students of economic development have made reference to a U-shaped
relationship between women's labor force participation rate and economic development (for
example, Durand 1975, Psacharopoulus and Tzannatos 1989, although see Schultz 1991, on the
distinction between wage and non-wage labor). The association between the two can be seen In
Figure 1, which graphs the participation rate of women 45 to 59 years old against (log) per capita
GDP (1985 $), where all variables are for c. 198O. Per capita GDP may not be the best variable
to proxy economic development, and the relationship also graphed in Figure 2 using the number
3of years schooling of the male population over 25 years old, also For c. 1980. Each graph contains
the regression line from a simple quadratic equalion,'
I shouldacknowledgeat the outset that the data come from the work ol many other
researchers, The education data are.from Barro and Lee (1993), the GDP/capita (1985 $) data
are from Summers and Heston (1991), and the female labor force participation rates are from the
extensive United Nations WISTAT collection (United Nations 1992), as are additional data, used
below, on sectoral or occupational shares.' It should also be noted that the definition of
employment varies across the countries but it generally includes unpaid family farm workers, those
In family businesses, and own-account traders.'
The general contours of the diagrams are not decidedly different when one of the younger
age groups —25 to 44 years old -- is graphed? The lower-aged group, however, contains many
unmarried women, particularly at the younger ages, and women whose fertility decisions also
impact their labor Force decisions. The older age group is preferred for various reasons, although
it, too, presents problems. The older group will contain widows and abandoned women, and thus
not fully reflect the determinants of female labor force participation I would like to isolate. There
is yet an add ibonal problem presented by the older age group. I would like to see if educational
advances and structural change in the economy are later reflected in the female participation rates.
But these changes would first impact young, single women. For the employment decisions of the
older age group to reveal changes in schooling levels would mean that the educational advances
would have had to occur some twenty to thirty years before. Many of the countries of the world,
even those in the poorer category, have witnessed substantial advances in education (see the
essays in King and Hill 1993a, for example). But these advances have been somewhat recent in
origin for the developing world.
One final point about the participation rate data concerns the differentiation among the
labor force by employment status and by sector. Various researchers have noted inconsistencies
in the definition of the labor force across the world's countries arid have emphasized the need to
4separate employment into wage, unpaid family, and self-emplOYed Workers (see, for example,
Schultz 1990, 1991). Most of the countries reporting labor force data in WISTAT Include all three
sectors, although there are some inconsistencies (see notes to Figures 1 and 2). Schultz (1991)
reports that the U cannot be observed for any one sector. Employment in unpaid family work and
among the self-employed decreases with economic development, and the percentage In wage
labor is fairly constant until much later stages of economic development when it rises. Thus the
U is traced out by changes in the sectoral composition of the labor force.0
Few regions of thø world have incomes and educational attainment that span a very wide
range. The u-shaped function in Figures 1 and 2 is generally traced out by the regions, rather by
the countries within them. Beginning at the upper left of each of the graphs and stretching
somewhat down the function are East, Middle1 and West Africa. Below them and somewhat to
their left are North Africa and South Asia. Just to the right of arid somewhat below East Middle,
and West Africa are South Africa and South East Asia. These seven poorer regions comprise most
of the downward portion of the graph. At the bottom and into the beginning of the rising portion
are South America and Central America. The upward bend starts with southern Europe, somewhat
above it is East Asia, then western Europe, northern Europe, Noilli America, and parts 01 the
Pacific. There are outhers in various regions, but most the groUpings are. fairly tight. The outliers
Include countries In the Caribbean, whose female labor force participation rates are higher than
predicted by the regression line, possibly because women often work as Servants for foreigners
and tourists.
The downward pOrtion of the U has been interpreted In several complementary ways.
When incomes are very low, wOmen often work with other household members on family farms,
in home workshop production and as own-account workers. As Incomes rise, various parallel
changes occur that affectwomen's labor force participation Economic development generally
shifts the locus of productiori from the family farm and business to the factory; rm, and other
places of wage labor, These shifts often occur because of increased relative productivity outside
5family enterprises. Rather than working for the family, there is now the option o. wage labor in
agriculture and manufacturing at increased remuneration. But a general increase in income could
serve to decrease women's paid work and unpaid labor in family enterprises through a simple
income effect. Much depends on the existence of a social norm or stigma against married
women's working at manual labor in agriculture, industry, construction, and transportation.
Boserup, for example, maintains that factory work is almost universally abhorred by married women
in many parts of the developing world (1970, p. 115), and there is considerable evidence that the
social norm is widely held.9 There is also the much-debated Issue of how new technologies in
agriculture impact women's work. It is often claimed that various technologies, while increasing
income, also displace female workers through a reduction in female-specific tasks and an increase
in machinery operated by men. Both an income and a complex demand effect are implied.t0
As development proceeds education levels increase particularly for the males in the
population. Only much later, in many countries, do they increase for women. Incomes, therefore,
will continue to rise but women's relative productivity might not for some time, all of which could
serve to reduce women's labor forte participation levels further.
The rise in the U comes at a considerably more advanced stage of economic development,
and in most countries it surfaces only as female education levels have Increased beyond
elementary school. As women gain education at the secondary school level and can obtain
positions in the white-collar sector their labor force participation rates increase.
1.2Theu intheory
The previous discussion contained an implicit framework to interpret changes in women's
employment across the process of economic development A simple version of the framework is
diagrammed in Figure 3. There will be two variants of the framework. One is termed the non-
stigma equilibria and the other the stigma equilibria. Although it is possible to obtain a u-shaped
labor force function with economic development (e.g., increases in per capita income) in the non-
stigma case, the quantitative and narrative evidence appears more consistent with the stigma case.
6I begin with the non-stigma case. The difference between the two is that, in the Stigmatized
equilibrium, lamiHes compare the difference in their utility when the wife is working In the
manufacturing sector and when she is not to their loss in utility from the Stigma imposed by her
labor. The stigma is a11 or non& (that is, it does not depend on the number of hours worked for
the lirm). Therefore whether or not the stigma-equilibrium is binding depends solely on the utility
comparison.
The model contains one good (3) that can be produced by the family or by a
manufacturing concern (the firm).1' Women (meaning wives) can work for the mantrfactiring
concern as operatives (manual1 blue-collar workers) or, if they are sufflcientiy educated, as white-
collar workers, Other family members work either at home production or outside the home for the
manufacturing concern. There are three uses of the time of women: production of G by the family,
production of G by the firm, and child care (C).'2 Total time In hours (per unit time, say a year)
is given by T. Production of G within the family is governed by a production possibilities frontier
(PPF) given here by gaT. Increased income from other family members lifts the production
possibilities frontier upward by 613. The initial level of other family income is normalized to O
Decisions regarding the woman's time allocation are made by the woman who also considers the
impact of her work on the social status of her family. Her utility function is given by: U —
t.J(GC) - oS, where S is the utility value of the stigma and 5 is a 0 or 1 ndicator variable.13 It is
1 if the wife produces G in the (manual or blue-collar) wage sector, even If for a few hours a week.
I consider three periods, in the first there is no firm employment In the second period a
finn offers a wage and income for families rises because other family members work for the firm.
Women have the option of working for the firm as operatives. In the third period wages (or women
rise further, because women's education advances and they. are offered Jobs In the white-collar
sector of the firm. I will assume that there is a relationship between labor force participation and
the number of hours the representative woman (wife) works and that hours worked is total hours
spend in the production of 0, independent of its source.'4
7Figure 3 depicts a time allocation choice for a representative woman (wife) who chooses
point a and works AT hours in home production of (3 and OA hours at child care in period 1. With
increased income of G, but no change in their productivity, the woman moves to point b and
reduces her time in the home production of (310 BT. This change reflects the operation of the pure
income effect. But the appearance ot the firm also means that the woman is offered a wage to
work outside the home. Assume that the wage, relative to the price of G, exceeds the slope of the
PPF at b and that it is given by line V2. With line v2 a non-stigma or unfettered equilibrium has the
property that the woman would choose either to work for the firm and do child care or just do child
care alone. With wage given by line v2, there will be no home production of (3."
Thus in period 2 if the increase in family income comes first, the woman would reduce her
time in 0 production by AB (that is. by choosing point b). If the change in her wage occurs
together with the rise in family income, she could increase her total hours in 0 production (say by
CA) over that in period 1 (that is, by choosing point c).1' Note, however, that at point a the wife
spends AT hours producing (3 in the home, but at point c she spends CT hours producing 0 in the
firm. The non-stigma equilibrium holds open the possibility of a u-shaped labor force function, but
not necessarily if economic development increases family income and women's wages at the same
time.'7
In period 3 the woman's wage increases somewhat more, as given by line v3, through an
increase in her education and her employment in the white-collar sector of the firm. The change
in labor supply is now determined by the usual (uncompensated) wage effect. For the sake of
completeness, assume that the woman chooses point d.'8
A norm that stigmatizes families, particularly husbands, for having their wives work at wage
labor in manufacturing (or other manual jobs) wUI alter the equilibrium, particularly the change from
period 1 to 2 and from 2 to 3. The equilibrium in period I is unchanged, but the response to the
Increase in the wage with the appearance of the firm in period 2 could be.
Each family has a value S giving the utility that would be lost from the social stigma of
Bhaving a wife work for wages as a manufacturing operative or manual laborer. The stigma is not
a (unction of the number of hours at work but is 'all or none.' The wife Can do no better than point
c, ghien the option of working along v2, She can do no better than point b in the absence of that
option. The question, then, is simply whether (112 - U2) >1< S. If the utility value of the stigma is
greater than the gain from being at point c compared with point b, the family will choose to remain
at point b. The utility the family loses horn having the wife work in the manufacturing sector Is
more than offset by the gain in utility from an expanded choice set. The probability the stigma wilt
be binding is likely to be greater the lower the family income and will be greater the lower the
woman's wage.19
The social stigma against wives working in paid manual labor outside the home is
apparently widespread and strong. It almost always attaches to the work of women in male-
intensive industries (e.g., mining, iron and steel), but also exists In female-intensive (e.g., clothing,
textiles) arid mixed industries (e.g.. food processing). The prohibition is so ubiquItous that it seems
likely to be connected with many of the most basic norms in society — those which bind the family
together as a productive unit. The stigma is a simple message. Only a husband who Is lazy,
indolent, and entirely negligent ol his family would allow his wife to do such labor, The same
stigma does not appear to attach to widows and to female children doing the same wont The
shame, therefore, attaches to the husband and serves to enforce a powerful social norm that
obliges men to provide for their families. For various reasons, discussed below, the stigma does
not generally attach to women working in the white-collar sector.
If the stigma equilibrium Is binding the woman will choose point b in perIod 2, but she wilt
select point d when offered a white-collar job. Thus the movement across the three periods is from
a to b to d, tracing out a U-shaped labor force participation function.Z Note that when the stigma
effect is binding on at least some families, the econometrician will incorrectly measure the true,
underlying wage effect It will be measured as 0 between periods 1 and 2, and will be considerably
larger than the true underlying wage effect between periods 2 and sY' The response to a change
9in wages is first underestimated and then overestimated by the family's fettered equilibrium. As
more families make the move from a point like b to a point like d, the measured wage effect will
decreasa Therefore, the econometrician will observe first a negligible wage effect; then a very
large one, and then one of some moderate (and more accurate) proportion. The same effects
can be produced by a model with fixed costa As the wage rises, the fixed cost effect of entering
work outside the home binds fewer families.
The income effect is also biased. At higher levels of income there is a greater probability
of having the stigma effect bind? Thus if the only wage work for women is in the manufacturing
sector, their participation will decrease more as income increases. Some of the decrease will be
due to a decrease in home production (as in the movement from a to b). But some will be
because more and more farnSs reach the point where (U - U2) c S.
Thus, one explanation for the u-shaped function is that we initially observe the impact of
an income effect when women's educational levels have not yet advanced and when their only
employment opportunities outside home production are manual labor jobs in manufacturing and
agriculture, for which there is often a social stigma. Women's labor force participation will fall as
incomes rise and even as their own wage rises. Only when women are enabled to enter jobs in
non-manuai work through their increased education will their labor force participation rate rise
again.
1.3 Evidence on the rising portion of the U-shaped function
The downward portion of the u has been explained by several related changes, only some
of which are directly captured in the framework just outhned. Women's labor force participation
decreases with economic development because their household production declines as economic
development progresses while their wage labor does not immediately increase. A simple income
effect may be operating. Household-produced goods may become unprofitable to make and sell
relative to factory production. Similarly, changes in agricultural technology may reduce the demand
for women workers.2' A central issue is why women do not follow production into the factory
10Their reluctancecanexplained by the existence of a stigma or by any fixed expense of entering
the paid labor market outside the home, such as travel costs.
Understanding why the female labor force function begins to rise, is the next topic and
leads to an exploration of the relationships among economic development, female education, and
white-collar employment. The first issue to address Is when female schooling levels Increase.
At relatively low Incomes and low male schooling levels, the ratio of male to female
education is extremely high. As resource constraints are reduced both male education and female
education rise, but female education rates rise faster and begin to converge on those of males.
The sources of reduced resource constraints can be found at the household and governmental
levels.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the ratio of male to female secondary schooling
gross enrollmentratesand years of education among the male adult population. Wth Increased
male education the ratio of male to female gross enrollment in secondary school declines, rapidly
becoming one and often less.26 Increased income1 as reflected In the Increase in education levels
for the male adult population, at some point leads families to endow their girls with relatively more
education and also aids in the extension of publicly-provided education.
Increased income fuels schooling and expands the supply of educated workers to the
white-collar sector. Figure 5 showS the positive association between whW-collar employment and
GOP/capita? But increased GDP/capita is also an indicator that the economy has undergone
a structural transformation that decreases the agricultural sector and increases that in services.
Both demand and supply effects work in tandem to increase the share of the labor force In white-
collar employment. At higher income levels the demand for educated workers is greater and with
greater incomes the supply of educated workers expands.
But increased GOP/capita, or its general correLate years of schooling for the adult male
population, alone is insufficient to raise the fraction of all employed women who are clerical workers
or to raise the proportion of all clerical workers who are Women. Figure 6 graphs the relationship
11between the ratio of female to male clerical workers and the log difference between adult male and
female years of education (see also the discussion of this relationship Itt Boserup 1970, chapter
8). A line has been drawn at the 15% difference mark in terms of male and female educational
levels and at equality in their employment in the clerical sector.
Most of the countries to the southwest of the crossing point have very low levels of both
female and male education. They have few women relative to men in clerical work despite equality
of education. Those countries to the northeast, and there are only three, have a high ratio of
women in clerical work although their educational levels are less equaL Two of these countries
are Singapore and Hong Kong. All of the test of the countries lie along what appears to be a
hyperbola, with the very highest ratios of women to men in the clerical sector found for those
countries with the most equality of education between the sexes (note that severaJ countries,
including the United States, having a sex ratio in the clerical sector above 3 have been omitted
1mm the graph). As long as males receive considerably more education than do females, the ratio
of women to men in the clerical sector is low.
But the relationship graphed in Figure 6 might be caused by the fact that women's
education levels are low, not just relative to men, when the difference in the education is highest
Their absence as clerical workers, then, would stem then from their lack of education in absolute
temis. In a regression context we can hold both constant and observe that the ratio of the male
to female educational attainment matters, to some degree, even when the percentage of women
in the adult population who attended any secondary school is included:
Dependent variable: (Female/Male) Clerical Workers
Log(male/female years of education) -0.375 (1.84)
% females with secondary education 0.0315 (6.23)
Constant 0.523 (3.03)
adjusted A2 - 0.47; number of observations - 83
Ordinary least squares estimation; t-statistics in parentheses.
Sources: Occupational distribution and labor force participation rates c. 1980: United Nations
(1992); years of school for the adult (> 25 years) female and populations In 1980: Barro and Lee
(1993).
12The ratio of female to male clencal workers rises with female secondary schooling and falls as the
ratio of male to female total years of education for the adult population rises. As Boserup
observes, competition from men serves to force women out of clerical employment
Both effects -- increased education and increased white-collar employment-- Impact the
labor force participation of women, particularly those who are married and older. The social stigma
against a wife's working generally does not exist for occupations in office work and sales, even
when it is very strong in manual laborP Thus increased education of women, particularly at the
secondary school level, will increase the female share of office and sales employment. The
increase will be almost immediate, since these women often take such positions directly after their
school years. But the impact on the labor force participation of married women could take several
decades more. The young women whose educational levels increase and who become office
workers upon graduation will marry, have children, exit from the labor force, and then return to the
work force later in their lives. Thus part of the rising portion of the U-shaped function may trace
out the increase in women's secondary schooling and their employment in the clerical and sales
sectors of the various economies.
Strong evidence for the theory just proposed is difficult to muster In large measure because
the data available are not appropriate to it. The theory is one Of generational change, but thC data
sets are generally cross sectional or have limited historical Information for the countries. One
suggestive regression is:
Dependent variable: Female labor force participation rate of 45 to 59 year olds
% male labor force in white-collar sector -0.793 (2,16)
% of female labor force in clerical sector (%FC LEA) -1.25(2.16)
Years of schooling of adult women (FSCHL) 0.0153 (0.63)
%FCLER FSCHL 0.168 (2.25)
Constant 0.514 (6.59)
adjusted A2 0.18; number of observations — 82
Ordinary least squares estimation; t-statistics in parentheses.
Sources: Occupational distribution and labor force participation rates c. 1980: United Nations
(1992); years of school hr the idult (>25 years) female population in 1980: Barro and Lee (1993).
13The labor tome participation rate of women 45 to 59 years old decreases with increases in the
white-collar fraction of all employed men, a likely consequence of an income effect. It decreases
with increases in percent of the female labor force in the clerical sector when female education is
below about 7 years, but it rises with the proportion of female workers in the clerical sector when
female education levels are above 7 years, that is at the secondary school level. It also rises with
female schooling, although not significantly.It is most important that the female labor force
participation rate rises with female schooling in relation to the proportion of the female labor force
in the clerical sector. The interaction between female schooling and the proportion of the female
labor force in the clerical sector is the most telling result. Neither in isolation is sufflcient.
The rising portion of the u-shaped function has suggested to many that the (negative)
income effect eventually becomes swamped by the (positive) substitution effect. I have suggested
that this effect Is either caused by or reinforced by the existence of a fettered equihbrium. The
fettered equilibrium can be driven by a stigma regarding woman's work in the manufacturing sector
or by fixed costs of working outside the home.
One may wonder why the social norm against married women's working in manual labor
generally does not exist for white-collar labor. The social stigma against a wife's working in the
white-collar sector may be low because highly educated women across many cultures are ghtn
license to work for pay. The women thus employed are often teachers and nurses, but are also
in a variety of white-collar occupations such as sales and office work. If higher-class women are
given the privilege of working for pay in these sectors, then, the argument goes, lower income
women can as well. The point is that when a woman takes a job in manual labor she Is signalling
that her husband is neglectful and thus the norm — one protecting the family — can take effect.
No educated, higher income man would allow his wife to work in the manufacturing sector, thus
the wife must come from a lower-income household. But the signal is mixed when a woman takes
a white-collar job, She could be an educated woman manied to a hard-working man or she could
be an educated woman married to a slothful man. The norm cannot take effect.
14I am suggesting that one reason for the existence of the U -shaped female labor force
participation rate function is the relationship between female education and economic development
At low levels of development education increases for males far more than for females. Incomes
rise and the income effect on female labor supply serves to lower female participation. A norm
against women's working in manufacturing serves to reinforce the income effect, because the
higher is income the greater the probability of a binding stigma effect. As incomes rise even more,
educational resources are freed and females receive more education. As women take jobs in the
white-collar sector the stigma effect is eliminated, and the substitution effect increases. With
greater education for women and a larger white-collar sector, the Income effect falls because more
families no longer face the stigma effect of manufacturing work. The U is thereby traced out
2. The origins of manied women's labor lorce participation In the United States
2.1 The u-shaped female participation rate function in U.S. economic history
The labor forceconstructs that lie behind the various data in Figures 1 arid 2 are vaguely
consistent from country to country but not ideal. The constructs that are readily available to trace
one country through its history are often far worse. In the United States, for instance, the modem
concept of the labor force was first embodied in the 1940 census The concept previously used
was that of 'gainful employment,' for which having an occupation was equivalent to being In the
labor force, Most adult men listed an occupation, but the vast majority of adult women did not
Without careful archival research our knowledge of women's employment In the past would
be woefully lacking. In 1890, for example, less than 3% of all married, white women gave the
census taker an occupation (see Table 1). But we now know that a far greater percentage
worked for pay or produced for the market sector either in their own homes on the family farm,
or in the family business. Still others worked intermittently or for few hours a week and never
reported their occupation to the census taker. Given the social stigma against their working, it is
not surprising that the reported labor force participation of married women was extremely low when
15women's work was primarily in domestic service and manufacturing.
The historical record on women's work in the United States Is now sufficiently complete that
a u-shaped functional relationship can be found there as well. Rather than a participation rate of
2.5% for all married, white women an adjusted figure is probably Just under 15% in 1890. The
adjustments add in a fraction of boardinghouse keepers, unpaid family farm workers, and
uncounted female workers in manufacturing.3'
The more inclusive measure of the participation rate of married, white women probably
exceeded 15% earlier in the nineteenth century, arid it may have been considerably higher. We
now know, for example, that urban women in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
took part in their husband's trades when the businesses were operated in the family's domicile
(Goldin 1968) and that women contributed to market production on farms in a myriad at ways.
Thus it is likely that married women's labor force participation rate first fell before beginning its
steady climb upward sometime in the twentieth century.
By 1940, when the procedures used by the census established the labor force construct,
the labor force participation rate of all manied, white women was just 12.5%. The adjusted
estimate for 1890 is a bit below15%. Thus even though we do not know the precise dimensions
of the u-shaped function for U.S history, it seems clear that It existed. I believe that the bottom
was reached sometime in the 19205.
lt is not surprising that most of the discussion of women's labor force participation in U.S.
history has ignored the falling portion 01 the U, for it became apparent only as researchers scoured
sources other than the U.S. federal population census. It also became more obvious as scholars
looked to the development literature for guidance on studying the histories of industrialized
countries (Durand 1975). Their reasoning was quite sknple. If all countries taken together trace
out a u-shaped function, then each countr/s history probably did.
The rising portion of the u has dominated the literature on female labor fone participation
in the United States and other developed economies. Beginning at least with Mincer's (1962)
16pioneering article on the female labor force, the central question for economists has been how
women's labor force participation could increase in the face of rising incomes given the negative
impact of the income effect The answer, supplied by Mincer, is that the substitution effect was
strongly posftive and that it swamped the income effect (see, for example, the articles in Layard
and Mincer 1985, lot a confirmation of the relationship across a variety ot developed
economies)!
We now know that the histories of women's employment in many developed economies
trace out the same type of Li-shaped function apparent across a variety of the world's countries
at any point in time, such as those in Figures 1 and 2. If the substitution effect strongly outweighs
the income effect along the rising portion of the U, what happens at the other side of the u and
what causes the function to change directions and turn upward? The existence of a u-shaped
function raises the distinct possibility that measured income and substitution effects may not be
constant across the process of economic development
The reasons why the function changes direction can be sought in whatever factors cause
the substitution effect to increase and eventually outweigh the income effect. As noted previously,
the estimated income effect may decrease over time as the substitution effect increases. By
reinforcing each other, changes in both the income and substitution effects could have contributed
to the upward portion of the u. There is also the possibility that relative prices (including wages)
change across the process of economic development or that certain fixed costs, for example of
travel to factory work, decrease. Although these are possibilities, the record for the United States,
at least, suggests that the primary change is fbund In the parameters of the income and
substitution effects.
2.2 Secondary schooling and lernale labor supply
The increase in the substitution effect, and the probable decline In the income effect,
occurred in the United States some time after the increase in secondary schooling for both male
and female youths? Secondary school enrollments and graduation rates advanced at
17remarkable rates in the first several decades of the twentieth century. The graduation rate in the
non-South regions of the United States rose from less than 10% of the .17-year old population in
1910 to about 50% by about 1937 (see Figure 7). Thus the median 17-year old in the non-South
United States in 1937 was a high School graduate, even though just twenty-seven years before
fewer than one in ten 17-year olds would have received a high school diplomaP It should also
be pointed out that the graduation rates in Figure 7 have been drawn to the late 1950s to highlight
the fact that the growth of high schools during the 1920 to 1937 period was extraordinary. Virtually
all of the increase during the half-century depicted occurred in that seventeen-year period.
Female youths were 1.5 times more likely to graduate secondary school than were male
youths in the 1910s and 1.25 times more likely in the 1920s. In fact, in every year and in every
region in the United States, young women were more likely to enroll, attend, and graduate from
secondary school than were young men.
Many cf the world's countries have undergone a similar transformation of their secondary
schools during the past thirty years. That occurring in the southern portion of the Western
Hemisphere comes the closest to what occurred in the United States during the 1920 to 1937
period although the levels are a bit lower, Mexico in 1960, for example, had a secondary
enrollment rate of 8%, but by 1987 It was 53%; that in Colombia rose from 11% to 56% in the
same interval. Almost all the countries of South America, Central America, arid the Caribbean had
secondary enrollment rates in 1960 in the 10% to 20% range (with the exceptions of Argentina,
Jamaica, Panama, and Uruguay which were considerably higher, and Haiti which was far lower),
but by 1987 most Latin American countries had secondary enrollment rates in the 40% to 60%
range. Because these rates also include the lower secondary grades whereas those for the
United States generally include only grades 9 to 12, comparability is imperfect. But it is likely that
a comparable enrollment rate lot the non-South United States in 1910 was about 40% and that it
was 87% by 1937.'
Another important area of similarity between U.S. educational history and recent trends in
18Latin America concerns gender differences. Latin America is the only part of the developing world
in which girls are educated in secondary schools to the same degree or greater than boys, It is
extremely interesting that the labor force participation rates of women in many Latin American
countries are at the bottom of the U in Figures 1 and 2, raising the distinct possibility, explored later
in section 3, that Latin America will soon see large increases in Female labor force participation
very similar to those experienced in the United States in the post-World War II period.
The equality of education by sex in the United States at the primary and secondary school
levels -- indeed the superiority of female education — almost throughout its history is unique in the
world's educational history. The only other countries that come close to such equality of treatment
are those that have been affected by U.S. occupation, and, as just noted, much of Latin America
but only for the past several decades. Part of the reason For gender neutrality in educational
attainment in the United States is the universal public funding of primary and secondary schooling
in the United States. But girls were taking advantage of this free schooling at decidedly higher
rates than were boys.
The reason girls attended secondary school for longer periods than did boys, and attained
high school diplomas at far greater rates, was becausesuch schooling had more obvious and
higher returns for them. The alternative to secondary school for a young woman was a
manufacturing job. Secondary schooling, on the other hand, offered her the option of an office job.
At the turn of this century many oflice jobs-- typists, stenographers, secretaries — earned very high
wage premia. But by the 1920s the wage premium paid to female clerical workers had tailen with
the large influx of teenagers from high schools and other students from a variety of business and
commercial schools. By the 1920s. the average female office worker earned about 30% more than
her counterpart in manufacturing and that premium probably remained in place until the 1 940s
(Goldin 1984, p. 14).It should be noted, however, that the private internal rate of return to
education is not so easily calculated. Had these individuals worked for the remainder of their lives,
the return would merely be the premium divided by the number of additional years of school
19needed to move fromthe manufacturing to the clerical job. But women in the 1920s and 1930s
did not work for very long after they ma med. even when they made the transition to white-collar
employment.
Manufacturing jobs were not demeaned just because they paid less than did those in
offices, because many industrial jobs paid relatively well by the 1 920s. Office jobs were decidedly
preferred because they were "nice' jobs, and they were the jobs that "nicV girls took. They were
cleaner, neater, generally shorter in hours, and they commanded considerably more respect That
young women gave these factors considerable thought is found in the contemporary literature on
vocations. •The ambition of the school girl to "work in an office" in preference to work in a factory
has often been commented on by vocational counsellors and others in touch with girls who are
seeking their first jobs" (Breckinridge 1933, p. 181).
A few years of high school catapulted a young woman from a life of drudgery and
disrespect into a world of comfort and courtesy, or so it seemed to her. The young man, however,
did not often see high school as having so positive an impact. The rather dead-end clerical and
sales positions opened to young women were not the road to success for the young man.
Machinists, electricians, and other tradesmen could enter their craft with far less than a high school
diploma and little apparent loss. Thus the apparent private return for young women was actually
higher than hr young men, even though the latter remained employed for a considerably longer
fraction of their lives.
Another change for young women in the 1 920s was their ability to remain in white-collar
employment alter they married. Only in textile-mill towns and other dties with light-Industry were
married, white women employed to any extent outside the home In the pre-1940s period.
Employment changes of the 1 920s were apparent 10 many commentators and were expressed, for
example, in the famous ethnographic study of the Lynds. "When one speaks of married women's
working in Middletown one is talking almost exclusively of Middletown's working class and the
lowest rungs of the business class. Among these last. . . there is discernible a tendency for a
20young wife to retain a clerical ob until her husband begins to get established. At the other extreme
of the business class, there are one or two young wives of men so wealthy that there can be no
question locally of their having to work,' and thus no reflection on their husbands' ability to
'provide' (quoted in Goldin 1990, p. 134). As more women became educated, the social stigma
of a wife's working declined.
The notion that the substitution effect rose over time and that the income effect declined
in absolute value is not just a-theoretical idea or mere rationalization of the time series movement
Rather, there are a host of cross section studies from 1900 to the 1960s that, taken together,
exhibit such changes (see Goldin 1990, table 5.2). The studies suggest that the substitution effect
was at a high point for U.S. women in the 19505 and 1960s, whereas the income effect may have
continued to decline from the eaily twentieth century down to the present
Thus Mincer's study, as well as other influential analyses of female labor supply, may have
been executed at the peak of the own-substitution effect in the United States (see Bowen and
Finegan 1969, for another early important study). Of more importance for the total Impact of an
increase in women's real wages, it may reflect a historic peak in the difference between the own-
substitution effect and the total-income elasticity Ithe income effect(the wife's full-time
incomelfamily total income)1. Also historically high during the 1 950s and 1960s was the difference
between the wage elasticity and the income elasticity. It is this difference that moves us along the
upward sloping portion of the u-shaped function as incomes rise, as long as wages rise equally
(or greater) for women than men. The stabdity in the gender gap in wages during that period is
evidence that they rose at approximately equal rates.
2.3 The rise of women's white-collar employment
I have alluded to the impact secondary schooling had on the occupations of young women
in the I 920s and 1 930s but have not yet demonstrated that their work was fundamentally altered
during the period. Also left to be established is the notion that participation in these jobs early in
their lives altered their predisposition to paid employment later, a somewhat more slender thread
21in the empirical analysis. Although the discussion emphasizes the clerical group1 many in the sales
and professional sectors, particularly teachers and nurses, could also be included.
The clerical sector is emphasized because office work required nothing more than some
secondary schooling, and its rise led to the first large shift in female employment away from
operative positions in manufacturing. Itwas also a sector that grew enormously in absolute terms
and in terms of its female composition during a brief period in American history that coincided with
the expansion of publicly provided secondary schooling.
In 1890 about 15% of all office workers were female and jUst 4% of all employed women
in that sector were married (see Table 2). By 1910 38% of all office workers were female and in
1920 the figure had risen to 48%. Thus by the 1920s office work in the United States had become
feminized, The share of women in the total employment of the clerical sector remained at about
50% from 1920 to 1940. But the share of employed female clerical workers who were married
reached 26% by 1940 and then climbed to 42% by 1950 when 62% of all clerical workers were
women. Whereas only 4% of all non-farm employed women were in the clerical sector in 1690,
more than 20% were thus employed by 1920.
The point is that office work became mainly a female domain in the 1920s, although at the
time it was the bastion of single, not married, women. Married women, however, increased their
numbers in this sector at a greater rate than they did in the nation's employment as a whole.
Although clerical work was a field dominated by relatively young women in 1930, it had the same
proportion of married women as did the female labor force as a whole by 1950.
The rapid increase in the number of young female clerical workers in the two decades after
1910 was fueled by the phenomenal increase in secondary school enrollments and graduation
rates, as shown in Figure 7. These workers were primarily unmarried women some of whom
continued working in offices and in sales positions for short periods after they married. But some
married women in the 1920s and many In the 1930s were faced with bars against their
employment in office work. Marriage bars - the stated policies of firms not to hire married women
22in certain positions and to fire single women who married while in their employ -- existed in the
1920s in some firms, but they became far more widespread during the Great Depression (see
Goldin 1990, chapter Thus the longer-run and full impact of the increase in white-collar
employment in the 1910 to 1930 period had to wait for the 1940s and 1950s when marriage bars
were generally dissolved and when the women of these cohorts were in the forties.
The evidence on the impact of early work experiences on later labor market participation
is slim for the period under consideration. One data set, however, has been found that contains
information on a women from a wide variety of backgrounds, interviewed in 1939 about their past
work and educational histories (Gold in 1989, table 3). The data suggest that women who had
worked in manufacturing early in their employment histories were less likely to be labor market
participants later in their lives. Their participation rates were 10 percentage points lower than were
those of the other women whose first jobs were in sates, clerical, professional, and other service
employments. Because the base labor force participation for this group was 25%, the Impact of
first employment in manufacturing was substantial.
The data set is insufficiently rich to separate the impacts of income effects, substitution
effects, and changing taste for work. There is, however, confirmation that whatever the locus of
reasons, a change in the employment of young women from manufacturing to white collar work --
even lower-paid white collar work in offices and stores — can Increase labor force participation later
in their lives.
The key point I am making is that the rise of office work In the 1920s and 1930s was an
important component of the increase in married womerfs labor force participation in the 1950s.
The explosion of married women's labor force participation in the 1940s arid 1950s was primarily
experienced by women older than 40 years (see Table 1). Although there were important
increases at the younger ages during those decades, the participation rates of married women
under 40 years were to soar later, from the end of the 1960$ to the 1980s.
Although I have thus far emphasized only the white-collar occupations that required just
23a high school education or diploma, the rise of high schools in the early twentieth century also
fueled the increase in college, normal school, and nursing school enrollment In the post-i 940$.
In the college graduating class of 1957, for example, more than 60% of the women became
teachers, social workers, nurses1 and librarians in their first few months after graduation (Goldin
1990). The vast majority of these women would exit the labor force with the birth of their children
and would remain out for varying lengths of time. But their intention in getting their degrees and
in their early employment was to establish an opportunity for future participation. The next cohort
of women would enter the labor force after school with the full intention of remaining in it with only
small breaks for child bearing and rearing.
A decisive shift had been made in married women's labor force participation. No longer
would young women exit from the labor force upon marriage not to reenter unless family income
was extremely low or when they became widowed or were abandoned. Women now planned their
education and labor force investments with a considerably longer time-horizon for their
employment. All of these changes find their origins in the rise of secondary schooling in the first
few decades of this century and in the rise of white-collar employment of women.
3. Economic Development and Economic History: Concluding Remarks
The path the world's developing countries are currently taking will never trace out that
which the United States took to the present The United States, for example, was never as poor
on a per capita basis as are the poorest countries today, and it never had as high a percentage
Muslim, Hindu, or Catholic as many of the world's countries, to mention but two differences that
affect comparisons in the status of women. But there are many similarities In the role of education
in spurring change for women.
In the early twentieth century the United States underwent changes in education not unlil
those currently underway in Latin America. In both cases, secondary schooUng advanced sharply
in a brief period of time and the levels for girls and boys were very similar. Many of the countries
24in Latin America currently occupy the base of the labor force tJ.shaped functions of Figures 1 and
2. In all but the Caribbean, female labor force participation rates (for those 25 to 44 years) are in
the 20% tO 40°i range. The percentage of female workers who are employed in the clerical
sector is in the 1 O% to 20% range, approximately what it was in the United States in the I 920s.°
The percentage of all clerical sector employment that was female is in the 30% to 40% range, once
again approximately equal to what it was in the United States in the 1920s.
Although I do not know from the aggregate data which women are occupying these white-
collar positions, I suspect It is disproportionately younger women, as it was, until the 1 950$, In the
United States. It is likely, therefore, that many women in Latin America are ripe for the transition
to the upward sloping portion of the U and that married women's labor force participation rates will
rise substantially in the next decade or so even if income levels do as well.
The newly industrialized countries of Asia present a mixed picture. In some, for example
Singapore and Hong Kong, educational change has been rapid and women are quickly moving Into
white-collar occupations. But in others in which educational advances are also great, for example
Korea, women are poorly represented in the clerical trades. This is also the case in the Philippines
in which incomes are lower than in the three countries just mentioned but schooling levels are quite
high.4° According to the framework proposed, married women's labor force participation rates will,
in the future, advance less in Korea and the Philippines than in Singapore and Hong Kong, and
that women's status in various ways will progress differentially between the two groups,
In sum, I have demonstrated that the labor force participation of women is generally U-
shaped over the course of economic development. The reasons for the downward portion of the
U are probably found in a combination of an initiaUy strong income effect and a weak substitution
effect, and a change in the locus of production from the home to the factory. It was the rising
portion of the Li that concerned most of this essay. Why the function changes direction holds the
key to why women enter the labor force at higher stages of economic development and why their
social, political, and legal status generally improves with economic progress. The reasons were
25sought in the change in the education of females relative to males as educational resource
constraints are relaxed, and in women's ability to obtain jobs in the white-collar sector alter school
completion. Their increased education and their ability to work in more prestigious occupations
both increases the substitution effect and decreases the income effect As the substitution effect
begins to swamp the income effect, the upward portion of the U is traced out; and women's labor
force participabon enters the modern era.
26END NOTES
1. By an income effect I mean the change in hours of work of an individualwithrespect to a
change in family income. The own-substitution effect is the change in hours of work of an
individual with respect to a change in their wage, holding income constant I will refer to the
own-substitution effect simply as the substitution effect By the substitution effect I will mean
the compensated wage effect
2. Miller (1982) is a fine study of the effects of women's employment in India on reducing
lemale seclusion and segregation.
3. All countries with available data except those in the Middle East and those centrally planned
are shown. The centrally planned economies are: Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Cuba,
Hungary, Romania, the USSR, East Germany, and Yugoslavia although data for some of these
countries was not available anyhow. Also excluded are countries for which the labor force data
differ substantially from those relating to employment status. The results do not materially
change if all available countries are included.
4. Even though certain religions are important in determining female labor force participation
rates across countries, the percent Muslim is not once the countries of the Middle East have
been excluded, in a regression of the participation rate on a quadratic In per capita GDP,
5. The economically active population data on which the labor force numbers are based comes
from International Labour Office (1986) according to the WISTAT reference manual.
Justifications for using the Barro and Lee data in preference to those of the World Bank
can be found in Barro and Lee (1993).
6. I have explored differences between the labor force data in WISTAT (which are from
International Labor Office 1986) and those (also from WISTAT) from various country sources
which are subdivided by employment status (wage labor, self-employed, unpaid lamily worker).
There are several countries in which the differences are very large. In some cases the labor
force numbers are greater and in others those by employment status are. Bangladesh, the
Central African Republic, the Dominican Republic, EL Salvador, Guinea-Bissau, Jamaica,
Jordan, Lesotho, Niger, and Pakistan afi have differences exceeding 30% In absolute value.
There are 8 other countries in which the differences exceed 20% In absolute value but are
below 30%. Mother 20 have differences that exceed 10% but are below 20%. These
countries have beenexcluded from both Figuresi and 2. lnonlyafewcasescanlfigureout
the precise reason for the discrepancy (e.g., differences in dates, exclusion oF unpaid family
workers). I should note that only the labor force data are given by sex and age, and that is the
reason for preferring them.
7. The WISTAT data contain only three age groups in the 20 to 59 year range —20 to 24, 25 to
44, and 45 to 59 years. There are also data by marital status and age, but many countries are
not covered in sufficient detail.
The relationship between the Labor force participation rates of the 25 to 44 year old
groupandthoseofthe45to59yearoldgroupisquitetight Forailcountriesinthesample
(not excluding those of the Mideast, for example) the relationship is:
lfpr 25-44 - 0.095 + 0.927 Ifpr 45-59, corrected A2 — 0.854 (N 164 countries).
278. See Hill (1983), for example, icr an analysis of the determinants of female labor supply in
Japan (C. 1975) which takes into consideration the choice of wage employment, family
employment, and nonemployment. The determinants between wage and family employment
are very different Whereas the wage and income effects on wage employment have the usual
signs, those on family employment have signs that are difficult to interpret and suggest that
some determinants have not been adequately controlled for in the analysis. Duraisamy (1993)
analyzes the determinants of wife's employment i.n wage labor and self employment in urban
south India and finds more neoclassical results in both employments. There is, though, a
greater negative effect of assets on wage employment than on self employment
9. Hem (1986) reports that in Mauritius the general tendency among single Iworneni workers is
to leave factory employment around the time of their marriage, even before they are pregnant
or have any children to look after (p. 288). The timing of these withdrawals is precisely what I
have found for the United States from 1890 to 1940 (Goldin 1989, 1990). As In other countries,
Hem notes that shusbands opposition to their wives' woiidng, particularly In a factory, is a
crucial factor in these withdrawals (p. 268). Mauritius is at the bottom of the u in Figure 2.
10. The impact of the Green Revolution is a good example. Mukhopadhyay (1991), for
instance, demonstrates that in West Bengal, India the introduction of high yield varieties
increased income, decreased female labor force participation, and increased fertility. The direct
income effect is only one part of the reason for the decrease in women's participation in
agriculture. The other part has to do with changed demands for sex-specific agricultural duties.
Weeding, a female occupation, was reduced considerably with the introduction of weedicides,
but the use of machinery, a male occupation, was increased with Green Revolution technology.
One may question the impact of the technological changes in the absence of income changes.
11. The model borrows from that in Gronau (1977).
12. There is no pure leisure time. The G produced by the firm and the G produced by the
home are perfect substitutes, as in clothing made by machine in a factory or in a home
workshop.
13. The stigma (S) is treated as a positive number and is, therefore, subtracted from the utility
level.
14. The model could easily be extended to the case in which there is wage work in home
production before wage work that takes place at the firm.
The relationship between female labor force participation and hours of work is
discussed, for example, in Goldin (1989).
15. The wage is always expressed relative to the price of 0. With wages somewhat less than
that given by v2 there would be some household production of G. None of this affects the
results, but makes the diagram cleaner.
16. Of course, the exact positions of points b and c are indeterminate. It child care and goods
are both normal goods (that is, if the income effects of both are positive), point b must lie to the
northeast of point a. By the seine logic, point c would lie to the northeast of a point on u2 (not
drawn on the diagram) that is at the tangent of U2 at a slope given by v. I have drawn point c
so that the substitution effect outweighs the income effect of the increase in the wage. That is,
there is an increase in time spent at work with an increase in the relative wage. But the
income effect of an increase in wages could outweigh the substitution effect and time spent at
work could decrease (that is, point c could be to the northeast of point b.
2817. As noted before, pointccan lie to the northeast of point b.
18. Once again, I am assuming that the substitution effect of a change In the woman's wage
swamps the income effect of the same.
19. It will be greater the higher is the wage Increase, for the simple reason that a higher wage
increases the change in potential utility from working outside the home. It will be greater the
higher is family income if marginal utility of income decreases with income.
20. Additions to the model will reinforce the u-shape. For example, if the movement from
home production to firm production involves a fixed cost, the kne V2 will be lowered a fixed
amount; equal to the fixed costs of going to work, getting another family member to take care of
the children, and so on. The choice set is now constrained to be some combination of the PPF
and the line v2 shifted down. -
Mother addition concerns the efficiency of household production when the firm
competes with it. The model is constructed so that there is no change in the efficiency of home.
production and no change fri the price of the home produced good relative to the firm-produced
good (as might exist if there were differences In quality). One possibility Is that as some
households reduce their production of the good, the fixed costs of marketing It Increase. If the
good were collected by agents, the price received for it could decrease as the market became
geographically thinner. Indeed, the market could become so thin that production is driven to
zero.
21. Note that the wages of women will be correctly measured because women also Include
non-wives, who do not experience the stigma, and because some wives will not face a binding
stigma-equilibrium. The econornetrician will measure the correct wage lncraase for women
from period 1 (notshown)tov2inperiod2becausewageswillberecorciedforsomewomen.
But families in which S is low will have wives who shift from point b to point c, whereas in
families having a high S wives will remain at point b. By the 'true wage effect' I mean the
response from point b to c, that is in the absence of the stigma. The more families with a high
value of 5, the lower will be the measured wage effect If S went to zero for all families
(perhaps because the job were no longer manual labor but was, Instead, an office position), all
wives would move from b to c and the true wage effect would equal the measured wage effect.
When S is high enough, the measured wage effect (from period 1 to 2) will be zero but will be
equal to the true wage effect (from period 2 to 3) when wages Øn office work) rise to V3.
22. 1 say 'more accurate' in terms of the non-stigma equilibrium.
23. ?Jthough this need not hold, it is likely to hold for some range of Income.
24. One way of incorporating the possibility that home or agricultural production methods
change, but that women are excluded from the new technology, Is to consider the fact that the
old technology can still be used but that the price of the output decreases relative to the value
of time in using the new technology. That is, the value of G is reduced.relative to family
income.
There is also the possibility that as fewer families produce in home workshops, the
costs of marketing and distributing the goods and inputs increases. When families are engaged
in piece-rate production, for example,.the greater the density of such families the lower the
costs of distributing the inputs and collecting the finished pieces As fewer families are involved
in piece-rate production, the per unit costs will rise. This change can be incorporated into the
model by lowering the PPF, viewed here as net production (actual production minus the costs
of disthbution and marketing).
2925. Many of the countries that lie below the line of equality of education between males and
females — that is, have greater secondary schooling rates for females than for males -. are in
Latin Ainerica.
26. The percentage of the total labor force in the clerical or office work sector could also have
been used. About one-third of all white-collar workers are clerical workers.
27. Boserup (1970) quotes from an lLO report on Uganda that 'The idea of being employed by
an outsider except in a post requiring education is distasteful both to her Ithe woman] and to
her family and husband' (p 116). In her discussion of India and Pakistan she notes that
public opinion makes a sharp distinction between work in home industries and 'literate work' -
which are regarded as respectable occupations, and factory work which is not regarded as
respectable for women' (p. 115).
28. When the same equation is estimated for the 25 to44 year old group slightly different
results are found. Years of schooling for adult women has a greater lmpact but the percentage
in the clerical sector has a smaller and less statistically significant impact. The interaction effect
is also smaller.
29. Boserup (1990, p. 141) suggests that as white-collar work expands for women In
developing countries manywill marry men with lower levels of education than they. Thus blue-
collar workers will have wives who are white-collar workers. But as long as the wives of white-
collar workers are themselves employed En white-collar work, such work cannot be stigmatized
in the same way that blue-collar work is for married women.
30. The percentage of married African-American women who listed an occupation was
considerably higher. Almost all of them were domestic servants or agricultural laborers.
31. For comparability with the labor force construct of modem estimates only a fraction are
included to get an hours-adjusted measure.
One could also question whether the data from certain developing countries accurately
count women whose labor is often hklden from view even though they are involved in market-
oriented production.. Many of the censuses on which the ILO data are based do try to count
these workers, but, as was pointed out in an earlier section, there are inconsistencies across
countries.
32. Most of the studies I cite estimate the income effect primarily from data on the income of
the husband, not from data on wealth. Thus there is an implicit constraint on the compensated
cross-substitution effect of a change of the husband's wage on the wife's time allocation. It is
assumed to be zero.
33. Secondary schooling in the context of United States history is grades 9 through 12; The
secondary schooling data for the cross section of countries include 7 through 12, or generally
ages 12 through 17 rather than 14 through 17.
34. It should be noted that these data are not yet corrected for various undercounis in both
public and private graduation data. it is unlikely that these adjustments will increase the 1910
figure to more than 15%. That for 1937 is likely to be virtually unaffected. Also, the data on
private school graduation do not exist after 1933. The entire function should be about 10%
higher after that date. These and other corrections will be made In my future work on the
history of secondary schools (for a preliminary work, see Goldin 1994). Only the data for the
non-South are used here because the South lagged in education In various ways.
3035. These data have been provided by Anne Hill and form the basis of King and Hill (1993b).
Data in Schultz (1988, table A-2) are similar and show that Latin American countries had an
increase in secondary enrollment rates horn 14% to 44% from 1960 to 1980. See also Bustillo
(1993) who reports somewhat higher rates than King and Hill (1993b), although the end date is
1987, somewhat later than in King and Hill.
36. The enrollment rate of 14 to 17 year olds was about 20% in 1910 and 80% in 1937 In the
non-South United States. Virtually all 12 to 14 year okis were in school In the non-South even
in 1910. Assuming that there were halt as many 12 and 13 year olds as 14 to 17 year olds
and that allot the 12 and 13 year olds were in school yields the numbers given. If the
proportion of 12 and 13 year olds in school was 80% in 19101 the 1910 figure would have been
33%.
37. The 1W has documented that these policies were widespread in the teaching field across a
variety of countries (see Goldin 1990, chapter 6). It is interesting that firms and school districts
instituted these marriage bars in white-collar employment since tile societal norm against
married women working in these fields was considerably less than In manulacturing and
manual labor. The husband was made to feel the stigma of his wife's working in blue-collar
employment, but society imposed a rule against her working in white-collar employment.
38. Note that I have switched to a younger age group because the interest here is in seeing the
impact of increasing education on the jobs and labor bce participation of younger women.
The data I have currently available do not divide the occupational data by age.
39. See Table 2 for the United States data. I have excluded female farm laborers from the
United States calculation but have not for Latin America, Thus the percentage would be higher
in Latin America than the 10% to 20% given1 and more like the United States in the 19205
when it was slightly higher than. 20%.
40. The percentage of all female workers who are clerical workers was 19% in Hong Kong and
26% in Singapore in 1980, but only 6% in Korea and 5% in the Philippines. The proportion of
ail clerical workers who are women was 51% in Hong Kong and 63% In Singapore, but 33% in
Korea and 42% in the Philippines. Hong Kong and Korea also had female labor force
participation rates for the 25 to 44 year old group that exceeded those for the 45 to 59 year old
group of women, whereas in Korea the older group's participation rate Is higher.
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Figure 1: Labor force participation rates for women 45 to 59 years old (c. 1980) and the log
of GDP/capita (1985, $1985)
Sources; Labor force participation rates: United Nations (1992); GDP/capita in 1985: Summers
and Heston (1991).
Notes: See Appendix 1, for the country codes; dots are given for countries that would have
overlapped with others. The centrally-planned countries and those of the Middle East (except
Israel) are omitted from the diagram. Also omitted are twenty countries for which the WISTAT
(United Nations 1992) labor force data differ substantially from those given for employment
status; see text. The regression line is a quadratic in the log of GDPlcapita.
Fiaure 2: Labor force participation rates for women 45 to 59 years old and years of school for
the adult (> 25 years) male population, both c. 1980
Sources: Labor force participation rates c. 1980: United Nations (1992); years of school for the
adult (> 25 years) male population in 1980: Barro and Lee (1993).
Note: See Appendix 1 for the country codes; dots are given for countries that would have
overlapped with others. The centrally-planned countries and those of the Middle East (except
Israel) are omitted from the diagram. France has also been excluded because of definitional
problems in measuring total years of education. Also omitted are twenty countries for which
the WISTAT (United Nations 1992) labor force data differ substantially from those given for
employment status, see text, The regression line is a quadratic in years of school.
Figure 4: Ratio of male to female secondary school gross enrollment rates and years of school
for the adult (> 25 years) male population, 1 980s
Sources: Male and female secondary school gross enrollment rates: United Nations (1990);
years of school for the adult (> 25 years) male population: Barro and Lee (1993).
Notes: Years of school for the adult male population is for c. 1980. The latest year of gross
enrollment rates from the source was used. It is generally between 1985 and 1988. See
Appendix 1 for the country codes; dots are given for countries that would have overlapped with
others. The centrally-planned countries and those of the Middle East (except Israel) are
omitted from the diagram.
Figure 5: Fraction of total employment in white-collar occupations (c. 1980) and the log of
GDP/capita (1985, $1985)
Sources: Occupational distribution: United Nations (1992); GDP/capita: Summers and Hestort
(1991).
Notes: White-collar occupations include those In the professional, managerial, clericaL and
sales categories. The % in white-collar occupations Is for c. 1980 unless data were
unavailable in which case the latest date was used (often in the mid-i 980s) or, if that were
unavailable, the c. 1970 figure was used. About 25 cases did not have data for c. 1980; See
Appendix 1 for the country codes; dots are given for countries that would have overlapped with
others. The centrally-planned countries and those of the Middle East (except Israel) are
omitted from the diagram.
35Eklure 6: The ratio of female to mate employment in the clerical sector and the log difference
between total years of school for the mate and female adult populations (> 25 years), c. 1980
Sources: Occupational distribution: United Nations (1992); years of school for the adult (> 25
years) male population: Barro and Lee (1993).
Notes: The percentage in clerical occupations is for c. 1980 unless data were unavailable in
which case the latest date was used (often in the mid-1980s) or, if that were unavailable, the
c. 1970 ligure was used. About 25 cases did not have data for c. 1980.
Five countries (AUS, CAN, FIN, NOR. USA) with ratios of female to male employment
in the clerical sector> 3, one (AFG) with a log difference between male and female years of
education > 1.5, and two countries (ARC. URY) with negative log differences have been
excluded from the graph for reasons of clarity. See Appendix 1 for the country codes; dots are
given for countries that would have overlapped with others. The centrally-planned countries
and those of the Middle East (except Israel) are omied from the diagram.
Fjqure 7: Male, female, and total high school graduation rates in the United States (non-South
regions): 1910 to 1960
Source: U.S. Commissioner of Education (various years), see Goldin (1994)
Notes: Graduation rates are computed by dividing the number of graduates in a given year by
the number of 17-year olds. Graduation rates Indude public and private schools to 1933.
Alter 1933 the number In public schools is multiplied by 1.1. The figures do not yet correct for
underreporting in the U.S. Commissioner of Education report They also do not yet include
graduation from the preparatory departments of colleges and universities. Graduation from
high school almost always meant completion of grade 12.
36Table 1
Married Women'sLaborForce Participation Rams:
The United States, 1690 to 1980
Year White, All Ages White, 25-34 Years White, 45-54 Years
1690 2.5 Il2.9 2.6 2.3
1900 3.2 3.1 2.6
191O'
1920 6.5 7.7 4.Y
1930 9.8 11.5 7.8
1940 12.5 18.7 10.1
1950 201 21.0 22.2
1960 29.8 26.7 38.6
1970 38.5 36.2 46.7
1980 49.3 56.0 53.4
'The figure in brackets is a revised estimate which includes various oMtted categories, such as boardinghouse keepers and unpaid family farm
laborers (both adjusted by hours of work), and manufacturing workers riot included in the population census. It Is likely that this figure is still an
underestimate of a female labor force datum that would be consistent with that in 1940, when the construct changed from one of 'gainful
employment'
ii Published data for the 1910 census are inconsistent with prior and subsequent data because oF a change in the labor force question that led
considerably more women on farms to listed an occupation.
'includes married, white women 55-64.
Source: 001dm (1990), tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.9.
37Table 2
Female Clerical Employment In the United States, 1890 to 1950
Year % In clerical % female ot all % married of female
sector of all clerical sector clerical workers
female workers employment
1890 3.9 14.6 4.1
1900 6.3 24.0 3.7
1910 11.0 36.2 n.a.
1920 21.7 47.7 9.2
1930 22.7 51.5 16.7
1940 22.3 51.5 26.1
1950 27.6 62.1 41.5
Source: Goldin (1964). table 1.
38Appendix 1: World Bank 3-Letter Country Codes
15 Letter Name WE Code
Afghani Stan AFG Honduras mm
Angola AGO Hong Kong HKG
Albania ALB Hungary HUN
Algeria DZA Iceland 1St,
Antigua and Bar ATG India IND
Argentina ARG Indonesia IDN
Australia AUS Iran (Islamic R IRN
Austria AU? Iraq IRO
Bahamas ERS Ireland IRL
Bahrain 31W Israel ISR
Bangladesh EGO Italy ITA
Barbados 3RD Jamaica JAM
Belgium EEL Japan JPN
Belize BLZ Jordan JOR
Benin BEN Kenya KEN
Ehutan BTN Korea, Republic KOR
Bolivia BOL Kuwait KWT
Botswana EWA Lebanon LEN
Brazil BRA Lesotho LSO
Brunei Darussal BRU Liberia LBR•
Bulgaria 3CR Libyan Arab Jam LEY
Burkina Faso - IWO Luxembourg LUX
Burundi BDI Madagascar MDC
Cameroon CMR Malawi MWI
Canada CAN Malaysia
Cape Verde CPV Maldives MDV
CentralAfrican CA? Mali MLI
Chad TCD Malta ML?
Chile CHL Mauritania MET
China CHN Mauritius MUS
Colombia COL Mexico MEX
Comoros COM Morocco MAR
Congo COG Mozambique MOE
Costa Rica CR1 Myannar BUR
Cote d'Ivoire CIV Nepal NPL
Cuba CUB Netherlands Ant ANT
Cyprus CT? Netherlands NLD
Czechoslovakia CSK New Zealand NZL
Denmark DNX Nicaragua NIC
Dominica DMA Niger Nfl
Dominican Repub DON Nigeria NGA
Ecuador ECU Nor-way NOR
Egypt EGY Oman OMN
El Salvador SLV Pakistan PAl
Ethiopia ETH Panama PAN
Fiji FJI Papua New Guine P110
Finland FIN Paraguay PRY
France FRA Peru PER
Gabon GAB Philippines PilL
Gambia 0MB Poland POL
Germany, Fed. It DEU Portugal PRT
Ghana 011k Puerto Rico PRI
Greece GRC Qatar QAT
Grenada GRD Romania RON
Guatemala GTM Rwanda RWA
Guinea-Djssau GlIB Saudi Arabia SATJ
Guinea GIN Senegal SEN
Guyana GUY Seychelles SiC






















United Arab Emi ARE











Note:AU counbies, with known codes,are listed evenif the countries are excluded from the analysis for
various masons.
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